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Cryptanalysis and improvement of Wu-Cai-Wu-Zhang’s quantum private comparison
protocol
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
In a recent paper (Int. J. Quantum Inf. 17 (2019) 1950026), the authors discussed the shortcom-
ings in the security of a quantum private comparison protocol that we previously proposed. They
also proposed a new protocol aimed to avoid these problems. Here we analysis the information leaked
in their protocol, and find that it is even less secure than our protocol in certain cases. We further
propose an improved version which has the following advantages: (1) no entanglement needed, (2)
quantum memory is no longer required, and (3) less information leaked. Therefore, better security
and great feasibility are both achieved.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Private comparison [1] is a two-party cryptographic
problem where Alice has a private data a and Bob has a
private data b. They want to determine whether a and
b are equal, without revealing any extra information on
their values other than what can be inferred from the
comparison result.
It is well-known that unconditionally secure quan-
tum two-party secure computations are impossible [2, 3].
Therefore, most existing quantum private comparison
(QPC) protocols added a third party to accomplish the
task (see [4] and the references therein). In 2016, we pro-
posed a QPC protocol [5] which involves two parties only.
Although it is not unconditionally secure, the loose up-
per bound of the average amount of information leaked
is 14 bits only. It is also very feasible because quantum
memory and entanglement are not required. Later, we
further proposed the device-independent version of the
protocol [6].
As Kilian pointed out [7], “the reason two-party pro-
tocol problems are so difficult is due to a simple symme-
try condition on what players know about each others
data”. Therefore, most previous studies on two-party
cryptography merely interested in the security against
internal cheating from legitimate participants (i.e., Alice
and Bob). The security against the attack from external
eavesdroppers is not considered as an obligated task of
two-party secure computation protocols, as can be seen
from the insecurity proofs [2, 3], the proposals on rela-
tivistic bit commitment that are considered uncondition-
ally secure [8–10], and discussions on oblivious transfer
[11]. That is, in literature two-party secure computation
protocols were regarded as secure as long as it can de-
feat internal attacks. It is not considered as a “loophole”
even if the external party Eve can cheat in these proto-
cols. This is also the case of our previous QPC protocol in
[5]. Nevertheless, it is surely an appealing improvement
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if external eavesdropping can be defeated too.
Recently, Wu, Cai, Wu and Zhang [12] reported the
above problem of the protocol in [5], and they also pro-
posed a new one (called as WCWZ protocol thereafter)
aiming to achieve security against external eavesdrop-
ping. They also stated that the protocol in [5] has a sec-
ond problem that “the result of comparison can be ma-
nipulated partially by either party”, and “He’s original
protocol is not suitable for a smaller bit-length compar-
ison protocol”. We would like to note that in [5], it was
already elaborated that 14 bits is merely the loose upper
bound of the average amount of information leaked, and
no cheating strategy has been found that can saturate
this bound. Also, when comparing short strings, Fig. 1
of [5] shows that this loose upper bound will be much less
than 14 bits (more rigorous calculation and comparison
with the WCWZ protocol will be provided at the end of
section III.C and in section VI.A). On the other hand,
however, we are glad to see that these bounds could be
made even lower. Unfortunately, Ref. [12] has not pro-
vided a rigorous calculation on the amount of information
leaked in their own protocol.
In the current paper, we will study the amount of in-
formation leaked in the WCWZ protocol, so that the
performance of the protocols can be compared clearly.
Moreover, we will propose an improved protocol, which
not only has all the advantages of the WCWZ proto-
col (e.g., secure against external eavesdropping, and low
amount of information leaked without the need of a third
party), but also requires much less quantum resources
(e.g., quantum memory and entanglement) so that it be-
comes much more feasible.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
the WCWZ protocol will be reviewed, and we will analyze
its amount of information leaked and related problems in
section III. In section IV, we will propose our improved
protocol. Then we will prove its security in section V and
compare it with the protocols in [12] and [5] in section
VI.
2II. THE WCWZ PROTOCOL
In section 3.3 of [12], Wu, Cai, Wu and Zhang proposed
the following protocol.
The WCWZ Protocol:
Step 1. Using a 1-to-1 classical hash function H :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, Alice computes the n-bit string
H(a) = hA1 ...h
A
n of secret information a, and Bob com-
putes the n-bit string H(b) = hB1 ...h
B
n of secret informa-
tion b.
Step 2. Alice divides the value H(a) into ⌈n/m⌉ (m ≥
2) groups, which are
X0 = {hA1 , ..., hAm}
X1 = {hAm+1, ..., hA2m}
...
X⌈ n
m
⌉−1 = {hA⌈ n
m
⌉∗m+1, ..., h
A
n−1}. (1)
Bob does the same operation as Alice and obtains
Y0 = {hB1 , ..., hBm}
Y1 = {hBm+1, ..., hB2m}
...
Y⌈ n
m
⌉−1 = {hB⌈ n
m
⌉∗m+1, ..., h
B
n−1}. (2)
(While we believe that the last terms hAn−1 and h
B
n−1 in
these two equations should be hAn and h
B
n , respectively,
here we present the original form of the protocol in [12]
as is.)
Step 3. Alice (Bob) prepares m Bell states as initial
states, every Bell state is randomly chosen from |Φ+〉 =
(|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, |Ψ+〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/√2. Alice (Bob)
records these initial states as SA (SB). The first particles
of all Bell states SA (SB) form the sequence SA1 (SB1),
and the rest form the sequence SA2 (SB2).
Step 4. Alice (Bob) prepares decoy states DA (DB),
randomly in states |0〉, |1〉, (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, (|0〉−|1〉)/√2.
Alice (Bob) randomly inserts DA (DB) in SA1 (SB1) to
form a new sequence S′A1 (S
′
B1
), then sends it to Bob
(Alice).
Step 5. After confirming that Bob (Alice) has received
the quantum sequence S′A1 (S
′
B1
), Alice (Bob) informs
the positions and the measurement bases of DA (DB) to
Bob (Alice). Subsequently, Bob (Alice) extracts the par-
ticles inDA (DB) from S
′
A1
(S′B1), and gets the sequences
SA1 (SB1). Therefore, Alice and Bob can check the ex-
istence of an Eve by a predetermined threshold of error
rate. If the error rate is limited to the predetermined
threshold, there is no Eve and the protocol continues.
Otherwise, Alice and Bob abort the protocol and restart
from step 1.
Step 6. Bob (Alice), respectively, performs X =
|1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| or I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| operation on the ith
particle of sequence SA1 (SB1) when h
B
i = 1 (h
A
i = 1) or
hBi = 0 (h
A
i = 0), and obtains the sequence S
′′
A1
(S′′B1).
Then, Bob (Alice) randomly inserts D′′A (D
′′
B) in S
′′
A1
(S′′B1) and forms a new sequence S
′′′
A1
(S′′′B1).
Step 7. Bob sends sequence S′′′A1 to Alice, and Alice
sends the sequence S′′′B1 to Bob. After confirming receipt
of the sequences S′′′A1 and S
′′′
B1
, Alice and Bob publish the
positions and the measurement bases of D′A and D
′
B (we
believe that the authors meant the decoy states D′′A and
D′′B) simultaneously. Alice and Bob recover the sequences
S′′A1 and S
′′
B1
through discarding the decoy states, indi-
vidually. Alice and Bob check for the existence of an Eve,
as described in step 5. If there is no Eve and the protocol
continues. Otherwise, Alice and Bob abort the protocol
and restart from step 1.
Step 8. Bob (Alice) performs X = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| or
I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| operation on the ith particle of se-
quence S′′A1 (S
′′
B1
) when hBi = 1 (h
A
i = 1) or h
B
i = 0
(hAi = 0), and obtains the new state S
′
B (S
′
A). If
S′B = SB (S
′
A = SA), then Bob (Alice) announces that
the compared secret information are identical after mea-
surements. Otherwise, Bob (Alice) announces the com-
parison which are regarded as different.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE WCWZ
PROTOCOL
A. A trivial problem
This protocol contains an obvious problem, probably
came from typos. That is, the secret information a and
b that Alice and Bob want to compare are n-bit strings,
but in step 3 they exchange m Bell states only (where
m < n, as can be seen from step 2), i.e., only the first
m bits of the hash values H(a) and H(b) are compared.
Consequently, there will be the problem that if H(a) 6=
H(b) while the firstm bits ofH(a) andH(b) happen to be
identical, their protocol will mistakenly output H(a) =
H(b) in step 8 as the final result.
There is a trivial fix to this problem. In step 8 when
Alice and Bob found the m bits being compared are iden-
tical, they should repeat steps 3-8 again, exchanging an-
other set of m Bell states to compare the next m bits
of H(a) and H(b). They repeat this procedure over and
over until there is a run in which step 8 shows that some
bits of H(a) and H(b) are different, or until all bits are
compared and shown to be identical. With this modifi-
cation, the protocol will always output the correct result.
Actually we believe that this is exactly what the authors
had in mind. But without this modification explicitly
written, the original protocol in [12] cannot be regarded
as correct.
B. Simultaneity problem
In step 7 of the WCWZ protocol, Alice and Bob are
required to “publish the positions and the measurement
3bases of D′A and D
′
B simultaneously”. But in litera-
ture, cryptographic protocols should generally be pre-
sented in a sequential way, that each party takes opera-
tions in turn, without requiring two or more parties to
perform operations simultaneously. This is because, on
one hand, according to special relativity, distant simul-
taneity – whether two spatially separated events occur
at the same time – is not absolute, but depends on the
observer’s reference frame. On the other hand, if the se-
curity of a protocol relies on simultaneity, then it leaves
room for potential cheats. For example, consider that the
distance between Alice’s and Bob’s sites is L, and they
are supposed to receive messages from each other at time
t1 which is measured in the same reference frame station-
ary to both of them. If they communicate with methods
in which the message carrier travels with the light speed
c, then each of them should start sending her/his message
at time t0 ≡ t1 −L/c. But dishonest Bob may set up an
“agent” site secretly, which is L/3 away from Alice. Then
if honest Alice sends her message at time t0, Bob’s agent
site will receive it at time t′1 ≡ t0+(1/3)L/c < t1. In this
case, Bob has a time interval with the length (1/3)L/c to
analysis the message received from Alice, and decide the
content of the message to be sent which could benefit his
cheating, and send it at time t′′1 ≡ t0+(2/3)L/c. His mes-
sage will still reach Alice at time t1 so that this cheating
cannot be detected. But he manages to delay the sending
of his message until he receives Alice’s message so that
the simultaneity is broken.
In fact, if there is an approach to force both Alice
and Bob to send messages simultaneously, then coin flip-
ping (CF) can be easily realized even without quantum
methods, as shown in the appendix. But it is a widely-
accepted result that unconditionally secure quantum CF
with an arbitrarily small bias is impossible [13–18]. This
is another evidence showing that in literature, simultane-
ity is not accepted in cryptography.
Nevertheless, in practice the cheating making use
of relativity of simultaneity not only needs extremely
fast quantum operations, but also involved very compli-
cated coherent attacks (e.g., those described in [13–18]).
For this reason, the requirement of simultaneity in the
WCWZ protocol still looks acceptable, and we assume
that it can be realized in the rest of this paper.
C. Information leaked
In [12] the authors did not give a rigorous evaluation
on the amount of information leaked in their protocol.
Here we provide such an evaluation.
Since Alice and Bob compare m bits of H(a) and H(b)
all at the same time, they will always know m bits of
the other’s data no matter the comparison result is iden-
tical or not. Therefore, even when nobody cheats, the
protocol leaks at least m bits of information to the other
party, with or without including the modification in sec-
tion III.A.
Now consider the case where the above modification
is included, i.e., if the first m bits of H(a) and H(b)
are found to be identical, Alice and Bob continue to
compare the rest bits. Given that the hash function
H(x) (x ∈ {a, b}) is a random mapping between x and
y = H(x), each pair of the hash bits hAi and h
B
i stands
probability 1/2 to be identical. Consequently, when Al-
ice and Bob compare the first m bits of H(a) and H(b)
using the WCWZ protocol, the probability for finding all
thesem bits to be identical in step 8 (so that the protocol
continues) is
pm =
(
1
2
)m
, (3)
and the probability for finding at least one of these m
bits to be different in step 8 (so that the protocol aborts)
is then
pa = 1− pm = 1− 1
2m
. (4)
If the protocol indeed aborts, then both Alice and Bob
know these m bits of mutual information on the other’s
private data. That is, there is probability pa that the
amount of information leaked is m bits.
Else if these m bits are identical (which occurs with
probability pm) and Alice and Bob continue to compare
the next m bits by repeating steps 3-8 for the 2nd round,
then again there will be probability pa that the next m
bits are different so that the protocol aborts after the 2nd
round. In this case both parties know the first 2m bits.
That is, with probability pmpa the protocol will abort at
the 2nd round, and the amount of information leaked is
2m bits.
Continue with this analysis, we can see that the prob-
ability for the protocol to abort at the i-th round is
pi = (pm)
i−1pa =
1
2m(i−1)
(
1− 1
2m
)
, (5)
and the amount of information leaked is im bits.
For simplicity, suppose that n/m is an integer. Then
summing over all possible i values, we finally yield the
average amount of mutual information leaked
I =
⌈n/m⌉∑
i=1
(im× pi) = m
⌈n/m⌉∑
i=1
i(2m − 1)
2im
. (6)
Note that this value does not included the amount of
information leaked when the protocol never aborts in the
middle, but continues until all bits are compared and
found to be identical instead. This is correct, because
when a and b are identical, both Alice and Bob surely
know all the n bits, and this is allowed since by definition
a QPC protocol is secure as long as it does not reveal any
extra information on the compared values “other than
what can be inferred from the comparison result”.
Fig.1 shows I as a function of the value of m, as cal-
culated from Eq. (6), with the length of the compared
4FIG. 1: The average amount of information leaked I as a
function of the parameter m in the WCWZ protocol when
the length of the strings being compared is n = 360360.
strings a and b is fixed as n = 360360. From the figure
we can find the following results:
(1) The value of I grows as m increases. It indicates
that introducing m in the WCWZ protocol is completely
unnecessary, and taking m ≥ 2 in step 2 is not a wise
choice. The less m value is, the less amount of informa-
tion will be leaked to Alice and Bob. Thus the optimal
choice is m = 1. That is, Alice and Bob should not di-
videH(a) andH(b) into ⌈n/m⌉ groups in step 2. Instead,
they should better compare them bit-by-bit, like we did
in our protocol in [5].
(2) If Alice and Bob choose m ≥ 14, then there is
I ≥ 14 bits. In this case the WCWZ protocol is always
less secure than ours in [5] for any length of the strings
being compared.
(3) When comparing very short strings, the WCWZ
protocol is also less secure than ours in [5] even for m <
14. For example, when n = 6, Eq. (6) gives that I ≃ 2.53
bits when m = 2, and I ≃ 1.88 bits when m = 1. On the
contrary, when using our protocol in [5], Eqs. (7) and
(8) of [5] show that the average amount of information
leaked for n = 6 is merely I ≃ 1.43 bits for dishonest
Alice and I ≃ 1.05 bits for dishonest Bob, both of them
are smaller than that of the WCWZ protocol.
D. Feasibility problems
The WCWZ protocol is also very costly in terms of
quantum resource.
First, it takes a great amount of quantum memory. As
can be seen from steps 5 and 7, whenever Alice and Bob
receive the sequences S′A1 , S
′
B1
, S′′′A1 and S
′′′
B1
, they need
to wait for the other party to publish the positions of
the decoy states DA, DB, D
′′
A and D
′′
B before they per-
form measurements on them. Otherwise, they may ac-
cidently measure the Bell states, while they should have
performed unitary operations X or I on them in steps 6
and 8 instead. Suppose that each of the sequences DA,
DB, D
′′
A and D
′′
B contains k decoy qubits, then the pro-
tocol totally requires the quantum memory for storing
2(k + 2m) qubits (i.e., (k + 2m) for Alice to store SA2
and S′B1 (or S
′′′
A1
), and the other (k+2m) for Bob to store
SB2 and S
′
A1
(or S′′′B1)).
Secondly, it requires quantum entanglement. Step 3
shows that for each compared bit, both Alice and Bob
need to prepare a pair of Bell state. Thus, to compare
two n-bit strings a and b, the protocol totally needs 2n
pairs of Bell states.
To this day, the technology for handling entangled
states is still far from perfect. Long-term storage for
quantum states is even more challenging. Thus, the
above requirements make the WCWZ protocol very in-
feasible.
IV. OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL
From the above analysis, we can see that the WCWZ
protocol can be improved in many ways. Here we propose
the following one.
Our Improved Protocol:
Step i. Using a 1-to-1 classical hash function H :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, Alice computes the n-bit hash value
H(a) = hA1 ...h
A
n of her secret information a, and Bob
computes the n-bit hash value H(b) = hB1 ...h
B
n of his
secret information b. Then they compare H(a) and
H(b) bit-by-bit, i.e., for each single pair of hAi and h
B
i
(i = 1, ...n):
Step ii. Bob encodes hBi as follows:
Step ii-1. Alice sends Bob the sequence S′A which
contains k+1 qubits. The state of each qubit is randomly
prepared as |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 ≡ (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or |−〉 ≡ (|0〉 −
|1〉)/√2.
Step ii-2. Bob randomly picks k qubits from se-
quence S′A and measures them immediately. The mea-
surement basis for each qubit is randomly chosen as ei-
ther {|0〉 , |1〉} or {|+〉 , |−〉}. These k qubits serve as
the decoy state sequence DA. The only qubit that left
unmeasured serves as the code qubit (denoted as SA).
Bob does not need to store the code qubit either. He
applies the unitary transformation X = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1|
or I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| on it when hBi = 1 or hBi = 0,
respectively, and the resultant code qubit is denoted as
S′′A. Then he inserts S
′′
A in another decoy state sequence
D′′A to form a new sequence S
′′′
A , and sends S
′′′
A to Alice
immediately. Here D′′A contains k qubits, each of which
was randomly prepared as |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 or |−〉.
Step ii-3. Alice measures all the qubits in S′′′A
using the same basis βA, which is randomly chosen as
either {|0〉 , |1〉} or {|+〉 , |−〉}.
Step ii-4. Bob announces which qubits of the se-
quence S′A was picked as the decoy states DA, and Alice
announces their original states. Bob checks whether his
5measurement result in step ii-2 conflicts with Alice’s an-
nouncement. Note that they should better reveal and
check these decoy states one-by-one, instead of revealing
the information of all the qubits in DA at one time. Once
they find a single conflicting result (in the ideal scenario)
or the error rate exceeds the predetermined threshold (in
the fault-tolerant scenario), they should conclude that
there is eavesdropping and abort the protocol immedi-
ately. Else if no eavesdropping was detected then they
continue. After all qubits in sequence DA were checked,
Alice naturally knows which qubit was picked as Bob’s
code qubit SA.
Step ii-5. Alice checks whether she had prepared
SA in the basis βA. If not, she tells Bob to discard all
the data for S′A and S
′′′
A , and restart from step ii-1 over
again. Or if the answer is yes, then it implies that she has
measured SA in step ii-3 using the same basis in which
SA was prepared, which is also the eigenbasis for S
′′
A after
Bob applied his unitary transformation X or I in step ii-
2. In this case, Alice tells Bob to keep the data of the
sequence S′′′A , and they continue with the next step. Note
that at this stage, Alice still does not know which qubit
in S′′′A is the resultant code qubit S
′′
A. This information
will be revealed later in step v.
Step iii. Alice encodes hAi using much the same way
as step ii, except in the reverse direction. That is:
Step iii-1. Bob sends Alice the sequence S′B which
contains k+1 qubits. The state of each qubit is randomly
prepared as |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 ≡ (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or |−〉 ≡ (|0〉 −
|1〉)/√2.
Step iii-2. Alice randomly picks k qubits from
sequence S′B and measures them immediately. The mea-
surement basis for each qubit is randomly chosen as ei-
ther {|0〉 , |1〉} or {|+〉 , |−〉}. These k qubits serve as the
decoy state sequence DB. The only qubit that left un-
measured serves as the code qubit (denoted as SB). Alice
applies the unitary transformation X = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1|
or I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| on it when hAi = 1 or hAi = 0,
respectively, and the resultant code qubit is denoted as
S′′B. Then she inserts S
′′
B in another decoy state sequence
D′′B to form a new sequence S
′′′
B , and sends S
′′′
B to Bob
immediately. Here D′′B contains k qubits, each of which
was randomly prepared as |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 or |−〉.
Step iii-3. Bob measures all the qubits in S′′′B using
the same basis βB, which is randomly chosen as either
{|0〉 , |1〉} or {|+〉 , |−〉}.
Step iii-4. Alice announces which qubits of the se-
quence S′B was picked as the decoy states DB, and Bob
announces their original states. Alice checks whether her
measurement result in step iii-2 conflicts with Bob’s an-
nouncement. Like step ii-4, these decoy states should be
checked one-by-one. If all qubits in sequence DB were
checked and no eavesdropping was detected, Bob natu-
rally knows which qubit was picked as Alice’s code qubit
SB.
Step iii-5. Bob checks whether he had prepared
SB in the basis βB. If not, he tells Alice to discard all
the data for S′B and S
′′′
B , and restart from step iii-1 over
again. Or if the answer is yes, Bob tells Alice to keep
the data of the sequence S′′′B , and they continue with the
next step.
Step vi. Alice (Bob) announces the states of a random
portion (e.g., 50%) of the decoy state sequence D′′B (D
′′
A),
and Bob (Alice) checks whether it conflicts with his (her)
measurement result in step iii-3 (step ii-3).
Step v. Alice and Bob announce simultaneously which
qubit in the sequence S′′′B (S
′′′
A ) is the resultant code qubit
S′′B (S
′′
A).
Step vi. Alice (Bob) compares her (his) measurement
result on S′′A (S
′′
B) in step ii-3 (step iii-3) with the original
state of SA (SB). If she (he) finds the states unchanged,
she (he) knows that hBi = 0 (h
A
i = 0). Otherwise there
is hBi = 1 (h
A
i = 1).
Step vii. Now both Alice and Bob know hAi and h
B
i .
They announce the comparison result to check whether
they obtained the same result. If they both find hAi 6= hBi ,
then they conclude that a 6= b and abort the protocol.
Else if they both find hAi = h
B
i , they repeat steps ii-
vi to compare the next pair of hAi and h
B
i . If all pairs
were compared and found to be identical, they end the
protocol with the conclusion that a = b.
Note that in step v we assume that Alice and Bob can
announce information simultaneously, just like they did
in step 7 of the WCWZ protocol. In case this simultane-
ity is not available, the protocol needs a minor modifi-
cation. That is, similar to our protocol in [5], when i is
odd (even), let Alice announce the information after (be-
fore) Bob does. With this modification, the amount of
information leaked will become a little higher, because in
the odd (even) rounds, dishonest Alice (Bob) may alter
her (his) announcement basing on what the other party
already announced, thus slightly increase the probability
for finding hAi = h
B
i in this round, like it was elaborated
in section 4 of [5].
As the WCWZ protocol made use of the existence of
simultaneity, for a fair comparison, in the following secu-
rity analysis we also take simultaneity as available, i.e.,
we only study our protocol with the original form of its
step v without including the above modification.
V. SECURITY OF OUR IMPROVED
PROTOCOL
A. External eavesdropping
The key reason that Eve cannot cheat, is because the
code qubits are protected by the decoy states. Espe-
cially, in step ii-1 (step iii-1) when Alice (Bob) sends
sequence S′A (S
′
B) to Bob (Alice), none of them has spec-
ified which qubit will become the code qubit SA (SB)
so that Eve cannot know it either. The rest k qubits
in sequence S′A (S
′
B) will all be treated as decoy states
DA (DB) and checked in random bases. Therefore, if
Eve intercepts and resends a portion (e.g., αk qubits) of
6DA (DB), for each qubit she has probability 1/2 to pick
the wrong basis and probability (1/2)2 that such a resent
qubit will be found as conflicting result in Bob’s (Alice’s)
measurement. For example, Alice prepared the state as
|0〉, but Eve has probability 1/2 to pick the wrong basis
{|+〉 , |−〉} to measure and resend it, and Bob has proba-
bility 1/2 to pick the right basis {|0〉 , |1〉} to measure and
also has probability 1/2 to find the result as |1〉. Thus
the total probability for Eve to escape the detection for
all the αk qubits will be
pe =
(
1− 1
2
(
1
2
)2)αk
=
(
7
8
)αk
, (7)
which drops exponentially to zero as k increases.
At the end of step ii-2 (step iii-2) when sequence S′′′A
(S′′′B ) is sending back to Alice (Bob), at first glance it
seems less secure because in step ii-3 (step iii-3) all the
qubits in this sequence will be measured in the same ba-
sis βA (βB). That is, Eve has probability 1/2 to pick the
right basis for measuring and resending all these qubits
so that she will not be detected. But in this case, she
still does not know hAi and h
B
i because these values were
not encoded as the states of the returned code qubits S′′A
and S′′B alone. Instead, they are encoded by the trans-
formations applied on the code qubits. Only these who
know both the states of SA and S
′′
A (SB and S
′′
B) can
deduce these transformations and learn hAi (h
B
i ). But
as shown in the previous paragraph, the probability for
Eve to learn the states of SA and SB while escaping the
detection is trivial. Thus, it is clear that our protocol is
secure against external eavesdropping.
Also, Eve cannot spoil the protocol (i.e., mislead Al-
ice and Bob to a wrong comparison result) even if she
made the right guess on the measurement basis βA (βB).
This is because if she resends all qubits as-is after she
measured them in this basis, then the protocol works as
usual since the values of hAi and h
B
i are not altered. Else
if Eve applies the transformation X on only one of the
resent qubit, then the probability that this qubit hap-
pens to be the code qubit (so that the value of hAi or h
B
i
could be flipped) is merely 1/(k + 1), which is trivial as
k increases. Or if Eve applies the transformation X on
more than one qubit, then there is at least one qubit will
lead to conflicting result when Alice and Bob checks the
decoy states. Consequently, when hAi = h
B
i (h
A
i 6= hBi ),
Eve cannot lead Alice and Bob to the opposite result
without being detected.
B. Internal attack
Obviously, when the protocol aborts at the i-th round,
both Alice and Bob surely know that the first i−1 bits of
hAi and h
B
i are identical, while the i-th bits are different.
There is no secret in these bits. Therefore, the goal of a
dishonest party is to try to make the protocol abort as
late as possible, so that he can learn more bits of data of
the other party. Now we show that this is impossible.
When both parties are honest and the hash function
H(x) is a random mapping between x and y = H(x),
the average probability for hAi = h
B
i (so that the pro-
tocol does not abort) is 1/2. To show that a dishonest
party cannot cheat, we need to show that this probability
cannot be increased.
As the protocol is symmetrical, without loss of general-
ity, let us assume that Alice is dishonest. Before step v of
the protocol, Bob has not announced which qubit in the
sequence S′′′A is the resultant code qubit S
′′
A, so that Alice
does not know the value of hBi . Therefore, even if Alice
has the power to alter the state of the code qubit S′′B to
change the value of hAi , the probability for h
A
i = h
B
i will
still be 1/2.
In step v, like the WCWZ protocol, we assume that
Alice and Bob can announce information simultaneously.
Then by the time that Alice knows Bob’s hBi , she has also
announced to Bob the position of the code qubit S′′B. As
Bob already measured S′′B in step iii-3 using the original
basis βB in which the code qubit was prepared, he knows
the value of Alice’s hAi from his own measurement result.
Thus it is impossible for Alice to change hAi at this stage.
Consequently, the probability for hAi = h
B
i is always
1/2 for any i, with or without the cheating from dis-
honest party. Then repeating the reasoning in section
III.C, we find that the average amount of mutual infor-
mation leaked in our protocol is also described by Eq.
(6), where m = 1 since hAi and h
B
i are compared bit-
by-bit in our protocol. The relationship between I (the
average amount of information leaked) and n (the length
of the strings being compared) is shown as the green line
in Fig. 2.
As we mentioned in the previous section, when si-
multaneity is not available, the protocol needs modifica-
tion. Then the amount of information leaked will become
higher because dishonest party may increase the proba-
bility for finding hAi = h
B
i in half of the rounds. But
since step 7 of the WCWZ protocol also makes use of the
existence of simultaneity, for a fair comparison between
the protocols, here we assume that simultaneity is avail-
able for our improved protocol too, without taking the
above mentioned modification into account.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF OUR IMPROVED
PROTOCOL
A. Security
Fig. 2 illustrated the comparison between the three
protocols. The green line represents the performance of
our above improved protocol, where the average amount
of mutual information leaked I is calculated from Eq. (6)
by taking m = 1. The black solid (dashed) line is corre-
sponding to the m = 2 (m = 13) case of the WCWZ pro-
tocol. The red (blue) line indicates the loose upper bound
7FIG. 2: The average amount of information leaked I as a
function of the length n of the strings being compared. The
green line (m = 1) is for our improved protocol. The black
solid (dashed) line is for the WCWZ protocol when m = 2
(m = 13). The red (blue) line is the loose upper bound of I
for dishonest Alice (Bob) in our previous protocol.
of the average amount of mutual information leaked to
Alice (Bob) in our previous protocol in [5], which is calcu-
lated from Eq. (7) (Eq. (8)) of [5]. From the comparison
we find the following results.
(I) Since the WCWZ protocol suggested to take m ≥ 2
in its step 2, it is always less secure (i.e., the amount
of information leaked is higher) than our improved pro-
tocol for any value of the length n of the strings being
compared.
(II) Comparing with our previous protocol in [5], as
we mentioned in section III.C, when taking m ≥ 14, the
WCWZ protocol is always less secure than ours in [5]
for any length of the strings being compared. Thus the
WCWZ protocol may be valuable only when 2 ≤ m ≤ 13,
which is covered by the area between the black solid line
and the black dashed line in Fig. 2. Even in this range,
when m = 2 (m = 13), we can see that the amount of
information leaked in the WCWZ protocol is still higher
than that in our previous one in [5] for n ≤ 10 (n ≤ 60).
In fact, even our improved protocol in the current paper
(where m = 1) cannot be less secure than our previous
one when n ≤ 8. Furthermore, as mentioned before, IA
and IB in Fig. 2 are merely the loose bounds of the pro-
tocol in [5]. Thus the claim in [12] that “He’s original
protocol is not suitable for a smaller bit-length compar-
ison protocol” is obviously wrong. Instead, the WCWZ
protocol is even worst for comparing short strings.
(III) The simultaneity problem. Both step 7 of the
WCWZ protocol and step v of our improved protocol
require the existence of simultaneity. Thus our previous
protocol in [5] wins again as it does not have this require-
ment. In case simultaneously publishing informations is
impossible, both the WCWZ protocol and our improved
one need modification. Then the amount of information
leaked in these two protocols could be even higher than
what is shown in Fig. 2.
B. Feasibility
This is where our protocols really shine. As we stated
in section III.D, the WCWZ protocol not only requires
the quantum memory for storing 2(k + 2m) qubits, but
also 2n pairs of Bell states for comparing two n-bit strings
a and b. On the contrary, in both of our improved proto-
col and the previous one in [5], Alice and Bob merely need
to send qubits prepared in the pure states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉
and |−〉 non-entangled with other systems. Also, once
they receive the qubits, they can measure them imme-
diately without the need to wait for the other party to
announce further information, thus no quantum mem-
ory is required. Therefore, our two protocols are both
much more feasible than the WCWZ protocol, and can
be implemented with currently available technology.
VII. SUMMARY
We analyzed the amount of information leaked in the
WCWZ protocol, and found that it is less secure than
our previous protocol in [5] against internal attacks when
m ≥ 14. For comparing short bit-strings with the length
n ≤ 10, the WCWZ protocol is always less secure than
ours no matter which m value it chooses, in contrast to
the claim in [12].
We also proposed an improved protocol, which is more
secure than the WCWZ protocol for any length of the
strings being compared. Moreover, the WCWZ protocol
has to rely on the use of quantum memory and entan-
glement, while these resources are not needed in both of
our improved protocol and the previous one.
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Appendix
Here we show that if simultaneity is available, then
perfectly secure coin flipping (CF) a.k.a. coin tossing
can be achieved.
CF is aimed to provide a method for two separated
parties Alice and Bob to generate a random bit value
c = 0 or 1 remotely, while they do not trust each other.
A CF protocol is considered secure if neither party can
bias the outcome, so that c = 0 and c = 1 will both occur
with the equal probability 1/2, just as if they are tossing
an ideal fair coin.
Assuming that there is an approach to ensure both
Alice and Bob to send messages simultaneously, then we
can construct the following protocol.
CF Protocol:
I) Alice picks a random bit a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob picks a
random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
II) Alice and Bob publish a and b simultaneously.
III) They take c = a⊕ b as the result of the protocol.
It is trivial to show that the bias in this protocol is ab-
solutely zero. And it is not only unconditionally secure,
but also perfectly secure in the sense that the cheating
probability of either Alice and Bob equals to zero exactly,
not just approach to zero with the increase of some se-
curity parameters in the protocol. Thus we can see that
the existence of simultaneity will conflict with the no-go
proofs of unconditionally secure CF with an arbitrarily
small bias [13–18].
